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AUSTRALIA’S HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO COPYRIGHT IN THE STRUGGLE TO
PROTECT COMMUNAL INTERESTS IN AUTHORED
WORKS OF FOLKLORE
Jake Phillips†
Abstract: Australian indigenous communities are vulnerable to communal harm
inflicted by the unauthorized, derogatory use of their works of folklore. Such works are
often considered sacred to indigenous communities and are granted significant protection
under customary law. However, under many circumstances, the 1968 Copyright Act, the
Australian law governing authored works, fails to protect works of indigenous folklore.
While an amendment to the Copyright Act appears a likely next step in Australia’s efforts
to recognize a community’s interest in communal works of folklore, Australia’s Heritage
Protection Act represents a more appropriate and efficient vehicle for addressing unique
communal interests in these cultural works.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past four decades, the demand for Aboriginal artwork has
grown tremendously.1 In 1988, retail sales of Australian Aboriginal art
totaled $18.5 million dollars (AUD).2 By 1997, estimates valued the
indigenous arts and crafts industry at over $200 million.3 Regrettably, this
increase in demand has been accompanied by an increase in the misuse4 of
artwork representing indigenous folklore.5 Such artwork takes various
†

Juris doctor expected in 2010, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Robert Anderson and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their
tremendous guidance and assistance. Any errors or omissions are the author’s alone.
1
Danielle Cronin, Appeal to Protect Artists, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Aug. 23, 2008, at A12.
2
Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and the Protection of Indigenous Cultural Rights, 2 ABORIGINAL L.
BULL. 5, 5 (1992) (Issue 56), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AboriginalLB/1992/
26.html.
3
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission (ATSIC), Cultural Industry Strategy: The
Vision (1997), http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/ 20060106-0000/ATSIC/programs/Industry_Strategies
/Cultural_Industry_Strategy/vision.html (last visited Jun. 27, 2009).
4
In this Comment, the term misuse refers to the unauthorized use of indigenous works of art in a
manner that is deemed derogatory and inconsistent with the treatment given by the respective indigenous
community.
5
This comment focuses on current and prospective legal treatment of communal material and
artistic works that embody indigenous culture and heritage. Over the years, scholars have employed a
variety of terms to describe such material. See, e.g., Daphne Zografos, Legal Protection of Traditional
Cultural Expressions in East and Southeast Asia: An Unexplored Territory?, 18 AUSTRALIAN INTELL.
PROP. L. J. 167, 167 n.1 (Aug. 2007) (noting that terms used to describe indigenous cultural material
“include, but are not limited to: ‘folklore’, ‘traditional cultural expressions’, ‘expressions of folklore’,
‘indigenous cultural and intellectual property’, ‘indigenous heritage’, ‘traditional knowledge’”). United
Nations Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes states that “[t]he heritage of indigenous peoples is comprised
of all objects, sites and knowledge the nature or use of which has been transmitted from generation to
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forms including visual art, song, dance, and oral stories.6 While the focus
has often been placed on the harms incurred by individual artists and
creators of folklore,7 indigenous communities also experience significant
harm when an author’s works are misused. In one representative case before
the Federal Court of Australia,8 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Lmt.,9 a carpet
company reproduced various designs created by indigenous artists on
manufactured carpets, which it then sold within Australia.10
The
unauthorized reproduction of the sacred images on carpets, to be trampled
by homeowners, was “completely inappropriate and offensive” to both the
artists and their respective communities.11 In fact, even though the artists
had no control over the misuse of their artwork, they themselves faced
serious consequences within their communities.12 Potential forms of
punishment include being exiled from the community, being denied the right
to paint the community’s stories, or in times past, the offender could be put
to death.13
The Milpurrurru case illustrates the importance of folklore within
indigenous communities. Indigenous works of folklore symbolize more than
a product of individual accomplishment worthy of economic reward.14 Such
works represent “the symbolic connection to [indigenous] culture.”15 For
instance, certain forms of art are grounded “in myth and ancestral
spirituality” and are “vehicles for narratives that remain central to ritual,

generation, and which is regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its territory.” This includes “all
kinds of literary and artistic works such as music, dance, song, ceremonies, symbols and designs, narratives
and poetry . . .” even those created in the future. U. N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Final Report,
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, ¶¶ 11-12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 21,
1995) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes). This comment utilizes the term “folklore” and adopts Daes’
definition of indigenous heritage and its past, present, and future manifestations where this term is used
throughout the article.
6
See Daes, supra note 5, ¶¶ 11-12.
7
See, e.g., Liam Beasley, Millions in Cash Changing Hands, Artists Not Seeing Any, Australian
Associated Press, July 29, 2003 (noting that current and proposed legislation involving moral rights for
individual artists does not provide adequate protection with respect to the resale of artwork).
8
The Federal Court of Australia is a superior court of record and a court of law and equity
consisting of a Chief Justice and other Judges that may hold office in accordance with the Federal Court of
Australia Act. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 5(1)-(3) (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/fcoaa1976249/s5.html.
9
Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240.
10
Id. at 243.
11
Margaret Martin, What’s In a Painting? The Cultural Harm of Unauthorised Reproduction:
Milpurrurru & Ors v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. & Ors, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 591, 594 (1995).
12
Millpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at 246.
13
Id.
14
See Samantha Joseph, Protecting Indigenous Culture, 6 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 18 (2006) (Issue
18), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/2006/23.html.
15
Id. at 18.
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landholding, and other aspects of lived culture past and present.”16
Indigenous society has a vital interest, both at the individual and communal
level, in protecting its culture that has been, and remains, embodied in its
folklore.
The Australian government is aware of concerns regarding indigenous
folklore and has recently taken steps to address the protection of such works.
For instance, the 2000 Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act17 added an
effective tool to the Copyright Act18 for attributing credit for an author’s
work and providing protection against derogatory uses of that work.19
Derogatory use includes a use or alteration of the work that is “prejudicial to
the author’s honour or reputation.”20 Although the Copyright Act governs
the intellectual property of creators of artistic works, the Act fails to provide
adequate protection for works of folklore involving indigenous community
interests. This failure is due in large part to the Copyright Act’s focus upon
individual protection of authors for a limited period of time; a focus that
conflicts with the communal and perpetual ownership of such property under
indigenous customary law.
This Comment argues that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Heritage Protection Act (“HPA”)21 offers a more promising vehicle for
guarding against the misuse of folklore because its protections apply to
communal works and extend over generations, in contrast to the limited
protections currently offered under the Copyright Act. The goals of the HPA
fit more squarely with indigenous concerns and thus it serves as a stronger
legal tool for implementing protection of Indigenous folklore. Part II of this
Comment examines the historical and contemporary background of current
Australian law protecting Indigenous creative works. Part III explores
relevant international laws and models relating to indigenous folklore. Part
IV analyzes the shortcomings of both existing and proposed copyright
legislation within Australia. Finally, Part V argues that Australia must

16

NICHOLAS THOMAS, POSSESSIONS: INDIGENOUS ART, COLONIAL CULTURE 197 (1999).
Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000 (Austl.) (amending the Copyright Act, 1968
(Cth) (Austl.)), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/cara2000342/.
18
Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_
act/ca1968133/.
19
See generally Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000. See, e.g., Meskenas v. ACP
Publishing Pty Ltd., [2006] FMCA 1136, ¶¶ 1, 2, 39 (holding that the painter of a portrait had a claim for
right of attribution and the right to not be falsely attributed where his work appeared in a publication
naming a different person as the painter of the portrait).
20
See Copyright Act, § 195AJ (Austl.).
21
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aatsihpa1984549/ [hereinafter HPA].
17

550

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 18 NO. 3

reform the HPA to specifically include safeguards for indigenous folklore to
ensure adequate protection of this important element of communal culture.
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
BELIEFS AND CANNOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT COMMUNAL INTERESTS

Copyright law is the branch of intellectual property law that grants
rights to creators of artistic works.22 Before copyright vests23 in the author,
the work must satisfy three requirements: 1) it must be original;24 2) it must
be in material form (i.e., written down or recorded in some tangible form);25
and 3) it must have an identifiable author.26 Copyright exists automatically
once these requirements are met and no registration is necessary.27 The
theory underlying copyright law is that protection encourages authors to
capitalize economically from their creations and to receive a return on their
investment by publishing their works.28 Although copyright protection is not
perpetual, it lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years,29 which
presumably provides ample duration to provide incentive for the creation of
new material.30 Furthermore, the law benefits society by encouraging
production and publication of new material and dissemination of that
material to the public.31 Thus, the impetus behind copyright law, as with
intellectual property law in general, is to encourage innovation and invention

22
See J.A.L. STERLING & GEOFFREY E. HART, COPYRIGHT LAW IN AUSTRALIA AND THE RIGHTS OF
PERFORMERS, AUTHORS AND COMPOSERS IN THE PACIFIC REGION 18 (1981).
23
To vest copyright in an individual is to give legal effect and recognition to that individual’s
entitlement to exercise those rights granted to an owner of the copyright provided in the Copyright Act
1968. See Council of the City of Sydney v. Goldspar Pty. Ltd. [2004] FCA 568, ¶ 91 (stating in contract
dispute that where a contract vests copyright in one party, other potential authors are not owners of the
copyright); see, e.g., Copyright Act, 1968, § 135ZZG (Austl.) (providing that copyright does not vest in the
copier of work who makes valid copies of a work for individuals with disabilities). See generally BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (8th ed. 2004) (“to confer ownership of (property) upon a person”).
24
See Copyright Act, 1968 § 32(1) (Austl.).
25
Id. § 22(1).
26
Id. § 32(1)-(4). See also TERRI JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE—REPORT ON AUSTRALIAN
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 52-53 (1998), available at http://www.
wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/folklore/creative_heritage/docs/terry_janke_culture_future.pdf [hereinafter
JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE]
27
See JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE, supra note 26, at 51.
28
See Joseph Githaiga, Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of Indigenous Folklore and
Knowledge, 5 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. at ¶ 4 (1998) (Issue 2), available at
http:/www.murdoch.edu.au/ elaw/issues/v5n2/githaiga52nf.html.
29
Copyright Act, 1968, § 33 (Austl.).
30
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 467 (4th ed. 2007).
31
Australian Copyright Council, An Introduction to Copyright in Australia (Mar. 2007),
http://copyright.org.au/G010.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
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by rewarding individual authors with a right to economically exploit their
creations.32
Indigenous folklore represents an important foundation for both the
maintenance of traditional and historical indigenous culture, as well as an
important source for the continuing growth of Australia’s indigenous
cultures. Wandjuk Marika, an indigenous artist from the Northern Territory,
explained the importance stating: “Our art and culture are very dear to us,
they embody the past history of my people, our beliefs today, and our
strength to survive.”33 When indigenous communities assert an interest in a
work of folklore, the interest represents a desire for the creation not to be
used in a manner that degrades or undermines the purpose for which it was
created—that is, to express and acknowledge important aspects of that
community’s tradition and culture.34
Adherence by indigenous communities to the traditional laws
governing their culture35 creates a conflict with Australia’s copyright regime
because communal concerns and expectations are not addressed by
Australia’s Copyright Act.36 Customary law remains a guiding force in
many indigenous communities,37 and encompasses two basic tenets:
religion and the community.38 As to the first, indigenous folklore is of
religious significance due to its representation of the Dreaming. The
“Dreaming” represents the “knowledge, faith, and practices that derive from
stories of creation” and is the foundation for the rules, behavior, and
ceremony governing Aboriginal society.39 Thus, because of the intimate
connection between indigenous folklore and religious beliefs, customary law
governs the creation and disposition of indigenous works of art.40 The
second basic tenet of customary law is the community.41 The community is

32

See Githaiga, supra note 28, at ¶ 10.
Joseph, supra note 14, at 18.
See generally, Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240.
35
See, e.g., Dean A. Ellinson, Unauthorized Reproduction of Traditional Aboriginal Art, 17 U.
N.S.W. L.J. 327, 328 (1994) (“Traditional Aboriginal customary laws continue to apply . . . in many
Aboriginal communities”).
36
See Michael Davis, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property Rights, Department of the
Parliamentary Library, Research Paper 20, at Introduction (1996-97), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs
/rp/1996-97/97rp20.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
37
See Ellinson, supra note 35, at 329.
38
Rob McLaughlin, Some Problems and Issues in the Recognition of Indigenous Customary Law,
INDIGENOUS L. BULL. (1996).
39
Australian Museum, Dreaming Online: Spirituality, http://www.dreamtime.net.au/indigenous/
spirituality.cfm (last visited March 28, 2009). See also Ellinson, supra note 35, at 330.
40
See Ellinson, supra note 35, at 330.
41
See McLaughlin, supra note 38.
33
34
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the recognized owner of cultural property, imagery, and folklore.42
Traditional themes and images must be protected against inappropriate
reproduction and use.43 Customary law requires that the group approve any
reproduction of the communally owned culture.44 The creator of the work
then becomes “a custodian of the cultural property, and any use, alteration or
reproduction of the work will need to be approved by community elders.”45
From the community’s perspective, once the creation comes to fruition the
community owns it because the creation constitutes communal culture.46
Thus, an inherent disconnect exists between the protections provided under
copyright law and those recognized under Aboriginal customary law: while
the Copyright Act recognizes individual ownership and exclusive rights for
an author of a work,47 Aboriginal customary laws provide for communal
ownership over works embodying tribal folklore and culture.48
A.

Despite Recent Legislative Reform, the Copyright Act Still Fails to
Adequately Protect Indigenous Communal Folklore

For over twenty years, the lack of legislative protection for Indigenous
intellectual property in Australia has concerned various groups tasked with
representing indigenous interests, including the Australian government.49 In
1981, a Working Party on the Protection of Aboriginal Folklore found that
existing legislation did not provide sufficient legal protection for artists of
traditional works of folklore.50 A 1988 review of the Aboriginal Arts and
Crafts Industry further highlighted the weaknesses of the Copyright Act with

42
COMMONWEALTH OF AUST. DEP’T OF COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & THE
ARTS, REPORT OF THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ARTS AND CRAFTS INQUIRY 152 (2002),
http://www.arts.gov.au/public_consultation/earlier-consultations/cvac_inquiry/report (last visited Apr. 11,
2009) [hereinafter REPORT].
43
See JANKE, OUR CULTURE: OUR FUTURE, supra note 26, at 55 (“Under customary law, Indigenous
custodians are collectively responsible for ensuring that important cultural images and themes are not
reproduced inappropriately. The Indigenous creator must be careful not to distort or misuse the cultural
knowledge embodied in a work.”).
44
See Ellinson, supra note 35, at 331.
45
REPORT, supra note 42, at 152.
46
See Githaiga, supra note 28, ¶¶ 11-15.
47
See Terri Janke & Robynne Quiggin, Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property: The Main
Issues for the Indigenous Arts Industry in 2006, (May 2006), http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0013/2704/icip.pdf (last visited May 29, 2009).
48
See REPORT, supra note 42, at 152.
49
See ABORIGINAL & TORRES STRAIGHT ISLAND COMM'N, RECOGNITION RIGHTS AND REFORM: A
REPORT TO GOVERNMENT ON NATIVE TITLE SOCIAL JUSTICE MEASURE § 6.35 (1995), available at
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/20060106-0000/ATSIC/issues/Indigenous_Rights/social_justice/
Recognition/RECOG1.pdf [hereinafter ATSIC REPORT].
50
See id. § 6.35.
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respect to the significant interests in the protection and maintenance of
indigenous folklore as required under customary laws.51
The Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 200052 gave authors
additional rights in their creative works. These rights include the right of an
author to be attributed authorship of a work and the right to not be falsely
attributed authorship of a work (the right of attribution), and the right to
prevent derogatory use or treatment of their works (the right of integrity).53
Collectively, these rights are known as “moral rights.” Because moral rights
aim to protect the author’s integrity, they are inalienable, and thus cannot be
assigned or transferred to another with a sale of the copyrighted work.54
Furthermore, such rights only accrue when the author has a copyrightable
work.55 Although moral rights are not specifically designed to protect
indigenous artists per se as the Act’s provisions apply to all artists, these
rights do provide indigenous artists with a useful tool to carry out their
responsibility to protect their works under customary law.56
In the same year that Parliament added moral rights to the Copyright
Act, Senator Aden Ridgeway, only the second indigenous person to sit in
Federal Parliament,57 pushed the Senate to extend moral rights to indigenous
communities as well.58 The Senator’s proposed amendment would have
included a definition of indigenous cultural work and would have allowed

51

See id. § 6.35.
See generally Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act, 2000, § 193-195AZO, available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/D25408DC39D0C132CA257434001EEDAE/
$file/1592000.pdf.
53
See Australian Copyright Council, G043, Moral Rights Information Sheet, at 1 (June 2006),
http://www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/infosheets_pdf/g043.pdf/view (last visited July 9, 2009); see also
Virginia Morrison, The New Moral Rights Legislation, 18 COPYRIGHT REP. 170 (2000), available at
www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A01n02.pdf.
54
See Terri Janke, Berne Baby Berne: The Berne Convention, Moral Rights and Indigenous People’s
Cultural Rights, 5 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 14, 15 (2001) (Issue 6), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/2001/11.html [hereinafter Janke, Berne Baby Berne].
55
Id. at 17.
56
See, e.g., Anna Kingsbury, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Culture Through Indigenous
Communal Moral Rights in Copyright Law: Is Australia Leading the Way?, 12 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 162, 164
(“[M]oral rights have the potential to accommodate some of the concerns of indigenous peoples . . . . Moral
rights may be applicable and useful in some cases where economic rights are inadequate, and moral rights
have a cultural dimension not found in the purely economic rights, making them more suited to protection
of cultural rather than simply economic value.”).
57
Danielle Cronin, In Obama’s Footsteps, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Oct. 31, 2008,
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/opinion/editorial/general/in-obamas-footsteps/1348339.aspx (last
visited Jun. 27, 2009).
58
Helen Dakin, Australian Copyright Council staff attorney, Call for Law Reform for Indigenous
Artists (Mar. 3, 2003), www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A03n03.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2009)
(article to be published in Copyright World).
52
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communities to assert moral rights with respect to a defined indigenous
cultural work.59
Although communal moral rights are still absent from the Copyright
Act, it appears the government is taking steps to adopt communal moral
rights in the near future. In 2003, a governmental joint media release stated
that “Amendments to the Copyright Act, to be introduced into Parliament
later this year will give Indigenous communities legal standing to safeguard
the integrity of creative works embodying community knowledge and
wisdom.”60 During 2003, a draft amendment was distributed to a few select
organizations (and one individual) for comment.61 In 2007, the Senate
Standing Committee on Environment, Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts introduced a report recommending that “the
government introduce revised legislation on Indigenous communal moral
rights.”62 However, despite these attempts to create communal moral rights,
the Copyright Act remains devoid of any provisions extending protection to
communities.
B.

Judicial Efforts to Protect Indigenous Folklore Highlight the
Copyright Act’s Inapplicability to Protect Communal Folklore

Past federal judicial decisions expose inherent inadequacies in the
protection of indigenous folklore under Australian copyright law.63 Cases
such as Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank,64 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Lmt.,65 and
Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles,66 all before the Federal Court of Australia,
59

Australian Democrats, Press Release, Democrats Seek Government & ALP Support for Indigenous
Moral Rights (Dec. 7, 2000), http://www.democrats.org.au/news/?press_id=2875&display=1 (last visited
Jun. 27, 2009).
60
Jane Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge: Australia’s Proposed Communal Moral
Rights Bill, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 585, 597 (2004) (italics removed) (quoting Dep’t of Comm., Info. & Tech.,
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Dep’t, & Dep’t of Immigr. & Multicultural & Indigenous Aff., Press
Release, Indigenous Communities to Get New Protection for Creative Works (May 19, 2003))[hereinafter
Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge].
61
Jane Anderson, Indigenous Communal Moral Rights: The Utility of an Ineffective Law, 5
INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 8, 8 (2004) (Issue 30), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/
ILB/2004/15.html [hereinafter Anderson, Indigenous Communal Moral Rights]. The draft was titled
Copyright Amendment (Indigenous Communal Moral Rights) Bill (Draft Bill). Id.
62
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
ARTS,
INDIGENOUS
ART:
SECURING
THE
FUTURE
(2007),
available
at
THE
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/ecita_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/indigenous_arts/report/
report.pdf.
63
See Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481(Austl.); Milpurrurru v. Indofurn
Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.); Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244
(Austl.).
64
Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. 481.
65
Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. 240.
66
Bulun Bulun, 41 I.P.R. 513.
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exhibit a struggle by courts to find a legal remedy to protect indigenous
ownership rights in communal property. These three cases highlight the
inherent conflict that arises when the Copyright Act meets with communal
property interests. With each successive case, the courts appear more
willing to craft protections for communal folklore, but each case also
highlights the shortcomings of the Copyright Act as an effective remedy to
this recurring problem.
In Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, the Federal Court declined
to recognize a cause of action for communal harm when the Reserve used
sacred images on a commemorative ten dollar bank note.67 Mr. Yumbulul,
an Aboriginal artist, inherited the right to make Morning Star Poles68 from
his mother’s clan group. Morning Star Poles are decorated wood poles that
“have a central role in Aboriginal ceremonies commemorating the deaths of
important persons, and in inter-clan relationships.”69 The Reserve Bank of
Australia incorporated one of Mr. Yumbulul’s designs on a Morning Star
Pole displayed at the Australian Museum in Sydney.70 The bank then
reproduced an image of that pole on its commemorative note. Its use of the
pole and the traditional designs thereon upset the Aboriginal community.71
The court acknowledged the concerns of Aboriginal communities with the
regulation of works deriving from communal folklore, but failed to find a
cause of action for communal harm.72 In recognizing the limits of copyright
law, presiding Justice Robert French wrote:
[I]t may . . . be that Australia’s copyright law does not provide
adequate recognition of Aboriginal community claims to
regulate the reproduction and use of works which are
essentially communal in origin. But to say this, is not to say
that there has been established in the case, any cause of
action.73
Thus, despite the significant harm felt by the community in having one of its
religious symbols emblazoned on the national currency, the court determined
that the law did not offer redress.
67

See Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. at ¶ 21.
See id. ¶ 4. Morning Star Poles are decorated wood poles that “have a central role in Aboriginal
ceremonies commemorating the deaths of important persons, and in inter-clan relationships.” Id.
Construction of the poles differs between clans, and the identifying characteristics of a clan’s Morning Star
Pole “may be maintained jealously.” Id.
69
See id.
70
See id. ¶¶ 4, 20.
71
See id. ¶ 21.
72
See id.
73
See id.
68
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Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., decided three years later, illustrates
the applicability of the Copyright Act to Indigenous individuals, but also
highlights the Act’s inability to provide substantive protection or forms of
redress for harmed communities.74 The applicants in the case were three
living indigenous artists and the representatives of two deceased indigenous
artists.75 Respondent, Indofurn, manufactured and imported into Australia
woolen carpets bearing reproductions of the artists’ designs.76 Justice von
Doussa found that Indofurn had substantially copied the artists’ work and
was liable for infringements under Section 37 of the Copyright Act.77 In
deciding remedies for the infringement, Justice von Doussa engaged in a
lengthy discussion of the monetary harms suffered by the artists.78 However,
he noted that damages under copyright law only extend to the “pirating of
cultural heritage” where such pirating directly affects the copyright owner,
not the community.79 The Australian Copyright Council suggests that
perhaps “his Honour meant to refer to the fact that the remedies under the
Copyright Act do not match the remedies that may have been applied were
the matter governed by customary law.”80 While the individual artists were
compensated under the Copyright Act, any “[a]nger and distress suffered by
those around the copyright owner,” such as that felt by the artists’
community, were not recognized under copyright law except to the extent
that it constituted part of the copyright owner’s injury and suffering.81
In Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles, John Bulun Bulun and George
Milpurrurru, both leading Aboriginal artists and members of the Ganalbingu
people, alleged a violation of the Copyright Act by a textile company’s use
of a piece of artwork painted by Bulun Bulun in 1978.82 The company
reproduced on its fabric “substantial aspects of the artwork.”83 Bulun Bulun
argued that the reproduction violated his personal copyright in the painting.
The textile company conceded that it had infringed on Bulun Bulun’s
copyright by printing his artwork on their fabric.84 Milpurrurru argued on
behalf of the Ganalbingu people that the community was an equitable owner
74

See generally Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.).
See id. at 243.
76
See id.
77
See id. at 264, 272.
78
See id. at 273-77.
79
See id. at 277.
80
See Ian McDonald, Copyright and Intellectual Property Concerns of Australia’s Indigenous
People, http://www.copyright.org.au/publications/A97n12.pdf (last visited May 11, 2009).
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See Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at 277.
82
See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 247 (Austl.).
83
Id. at 252.
84
See id. at 247-48.
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of the copyright and thus entitled to legal redress.85 The textile company
refused to concede that the Ganalbingu community maintained an equitable
ownership in the copyright.86
Bulun Bulun created the original work, a bark painting, with the
permission of the senior members of the Ganalbingu people,87 basing it upon
traditional communal knowledge passed down for generations.88
Milpurrurru premised the community’s claim on the theory that under
Aboriginal customary law, representatives of the community had the power
“to regulate and control the production and reproduction of the corpus of
ritual knowledge,”89 which the painting represented. Thus, while the legal
title vested only in the artist, the community believed it had an equitable title
claim based on the artist’s position as fiduciary90 in which he owned the
copyright in trust for the community.91 The fiduciary relationship arises
when one person’s “exercise of power or discretion can adversely affect the
interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.”92 In this case, the artist
was given permission to paint a work based on trust and confidence in the
artist that the work would be used and reproduced according to traditional
custom.93
The Federal Court first found that although Bulun Bulun had not held
the copyright as trustee for the community because there was no evidence
that he had intended to so act,94 there was a fiduciary relationship between
the artist and the Ganalbingu people.95 As a result of this relationship, Bulun
Bulun had an obligation not to exploit his artistic work in opposition to
customary law and, in the event of infringement by a third party, he should
have taken reasonable and appropriate action to remedy infringement of the
copyright of the work.96 Thus, although the court accepted the premise that
“[u]nauthorised reproduction of [the painting] threatens the whole system

85

See id. at 246-47.
See id. at 248.
87
See id. at 252.
88
See id. at 250-51.
89
Justice Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 711, 741 (2003).
90
A fiduciary is “[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of another . . . on all matters within
the scope of their relationship . . . .” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004).
91
Justice Ronald Sackville, supra note 89, at 741.
92
Bulun Bulun, 86 F.C.R. at 261 (citing Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corporation
(1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 96-97).
93
See id. at 250-51.
94
See id. at 259.
95
See id. at 262.
96
See id. at 263.
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and ways that underpin the stability and continuance of Yolngu97 society,”98
the court held that the only remedy available to the community in such a
situation is to bring a claim against the author as a fiduciary in order to force
the author to exercise his copyright interests in the work.99
This case exposes the vulnerability of communal rights with respect to
indigenous folklore and the significance of Australian copyright and
common laws governing the individual. However, by folding indigenous
customary law into Australian fiduciary law, the court was able to provide
one avenue of potential redress for communities faced with circumstances of
misappropriation by exercising the copyright second-hand through the artistproxy. Even so, the solution employed by the court relies on a specific
relationship between the artist and the community, as well as a valid
copyright interest held by the artist. It also forces the community to undergo
the convoluted process of acting as a third party in order to get redress for
direct harm. Thus, while communities may be able to employ the Copyright
Act under certain circumstances, the Act falls far short of providing
communities with an effective and efficient solution for protecting their
folklore.
III.

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDES GREATER RECOGNITION AND
PROTECTION FOR INDIGENOUS FOLKLORE

International authorities recognize the unique challenges facing the
protection of indigenous cultural expressions.
Although numerous
international legal guidelines exist, four are essential to a discussion of
protection of indigenous works of art: 1) The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”),100 2) the
Tunis Model Law on Copyright (“Model Law”),101 3) the Model Provisions
for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against

97

The Yolngu (or Yolŋu) are an indigenous Australian people inhabiting north-eastern Arnhem Land
in the Northern Territory of Australia. The Yolngu are made up of a number of different subgroups or
clans, of which the Ganalbingu are but one. See http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Yolngu.
98
See Bulun Bulun, 86 F.C.R. at 251.
99
See id. at 263.
100
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S.
3,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf.
Australia became a signatory to the Berne Convention in 1928. See World Intellectual Property
Organization, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
101
Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries (1976), available at
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/31318/11866635053tunis_model_law_en-web.pdf/tunis_model_
law_en-web.pdf [hereinafter Tunis Model Law].
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Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (“Model Provisions”),102
and 4) the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.103 Although none of these models and treaties govern Australian
law with respect to its treatment of communal folklore,104 they represent a
strong consensus by the international community that such protections are
necessary to recognizing and preserving rights to artistic works representing
indigenous culture.
The Berne Convention provides international protection for works of
art and literature. It was formulated in 1886, and was revised in 1971 to
include a provision allowing countries to designate a specific authority for
the protection of national folklore.105 However, one scholar notes that
“[a]lthough the concept of ‘folklore’ is a potentially useful one for
Indigenous concerns, as it embraces a more holistic notion of culture, the
term is relatively contentious in its relevance, applicability or
appropriateness to describe and define indigenous culture.”106 Furthermore,
the provision is optional, protecting folklore only where a nation has enacted
domestic statutes that recognize folklore as a protected subject matter and
authorized “a competent authority to enforce the convention’s vested
rights.”107 Even where nations meet these requirements, control is wielded
by the state, which some argue is “antithetical to Indigenous peoples’
aspirations for self-determination.”108 Therefore, although the Berne
Convention provides at least some avenue for protection, the process is
convoluted and the protection less than ideal from the standpoint of
indigenous people.
A more useful tool for indigenous artists is the Berne Convention’s
moral rights provision, which obliges signatory countries to include
provisions granting authors a right to claim authorship of a work and to

102

Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (United Nations Educ., Sci. and Cultural Org. & World Intell.
Prop. Org. 1985), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000637/063799eb.pdf.
103
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess., 107th
plen. mtg., UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration].
104
Countries are not bound by U.N. declarations (and Australia is not a signatory of the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Further, although Australia is a signatory to the Berne Convention
and thus bound by its provisions, that treaty does not require protection of folklore, though it does provide
an option for such protection. See infra Part III.
105
See Davis, supra note 36, at International Developments.
106
Id. at International Developments; Protection of Folklore.
107
Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 315 (1994).
108
See Davis, supra note 36, at Protection of Folklore.
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object to derogatory treatment of their work.109 These rights are inalienable
and thus the author still maintains the ability to enforce the rights even if
copyright has been assigned to another.110 Thus, with the addition of moral
rights legislation, indigenous creators have a substantive means for
protection of their work, even when the copyright is held by another.
However, the Berne Convention fails to provide enforceable provisions
requiring signatory countries to enact legislation that would shield
communal works of folklore from misuse.
The 1976 Tunis Model Law on Copyright, developed through the
World Intellectual Property Organization,111 expands the protections for
works of folklore suggested by the Berne Convention by exempting folkloric
works from various copyright requirements.112 For instance, Section 18(i)
defines folklore to include works by authors or ethnic communities. Thus,
this provision skirts the typical requirement under traditional copyright law
that a work must have an identifiable author, under which “communities” do
not qualify.113
The Tunis Model Law also protects “works derived from national
folklore.”114 Thus, where a work would not normally qualify for copyright
because the work builds only incrementally on traditional knowledge, and is
not therefore wholly original, under the Model Law, such works would enjoy
protection. Finally, the Model Law exempts folklore from the typical
fixation requirement.115 Thus, Aboriginal oral stories, traditional dances, and
performances would be protectable embodiments of folklore despite not
being fixed in some tangible form (as required by the Australian Copyright
Act).
Most recently, in September of 2007 the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(“Declaration”).116 The Declaration represents more than twenty years of
work by indigenous people to gain international support for recognition of
109

See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 6bis. Australia’s
inclusion of moral rights within the Copyright Act was its response to meet its obligation under the Berne
Convention. See Janke, Berne Baby Berne, supra note 54, at 14-15.
110
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 6bis.
111
The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) is a United Nations agency that is
dedicated to “developing a balanced and accessible international intellectual property (IP) system . . . .”
The WIPO, created in 1970, administers a wide range of treaties, including the Berne Convention for
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. One hundred eighty-four countries, including Australia, are
WIPO members. See http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/1007/wipo_pub_1007.pdf.
112
Tunis Model Law § 1(5bis).
113
See infra Part IV.A.
114
Tunis Model Law § 2(1)(iii).
115
See Tunis Model Law § 1(5bis).
116
See U.N. Declaration, supra note 103.
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distinct indigenous cultural rights.117 While numerous articles within the
Declaration generally address and protect indigenous culture,118 Article 31
secures a specific right for indigenous peoples to protect and develop their
cultural heritage and intellectual property.119
In addition, the Declaration emphasizes the importance of collective
rights of communities, as opposed to the highly individualized theory
guiding typical Western human rights discussion.120 Thus, although the
Declaration is not legally binding, its adoption marks a significant point in
the recognition of unique indigenous concerns regarding maintenance of
their communal culture. Despite the Declaration’s lack of direct application
to Australia, the underlying principles of the document should inform future
legal and policy debate aimed at increasing protection of indigenous works
within Australia.
As the international community continues its efforts to strengthen and
expand protection for indigenous works of folklore, Australia must
implement reform with respect to its own laws governing such works if it
wants to be recognized as a leader in indigenous rights. Despite Australia’s
commitment to moral rights under the Copyright Act, that Act alone is
unsuitable to provide broader protections for indigenous folklore. Australia
should divert its focus from the Copyright Act to the HPA if it hopes to
upgrade its protections for communities to keep pace with the international
community.
IV.

AUSTRALIA’S COPYRIGHT ACT FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
PROTECTION FOR INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

Because Australia’s Copyright Act governs the treatment of artistic
and cultural works, it currently represents the most likely defense against
misuse of traditional works of folklore. However, in many cases communal
works of folklore are not covered by Australia’s Copyright Act.121 While the
Act’s umbrella of protection fits well within the scope of Australian
intellectual property rights, the Act does not adequately protect indigenous

117

See Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELB J. INT’L L. 439, 440 (2008).
118
See, e.g., U.N. Declaration art. 5 (providing a right for indigenous peoples to maintain and
strengthen their cultural institutions); id. art. 11 (providing a right for Indigenous peoples to “practice and
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs”); id. art. 15 (securing for Indigenous peoples the “right to
the dignity and diversity of their cultures . . .”).
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United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 31.
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See Davis, supra note 117, at 462-63.
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See supra Part II.
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property arising under traditional customary law.122 Due to the unique
communal and historic nature of indigenous culture, works of folklore often
fail to satisfy the elements of copyrightable work. In cases where an
individual artist can obtain a copyright, and communities are extended some
protection by way of a fiduciary relationship with the artist, the protection
provided under the Copyright Act still fails to adequately protect the
communal interest in the work.123 Finally, despite the promise of an
amendment extending individual moral rights to communities, such
legislation would act only as a minor patch in an act replete with larger holes
that allow legitimate communal concerns to slip through the Act’s
protections.
A.

Indigenous Folklore Often Fails to Meet the Elements Required to
Obtain Copyright Protection

When an indigenous community grants permission to an artist to
create a work of folkloric art based on an element of communal culture, the
community generally has no right under the Copyright Act to protect the
final product from misappropriation or misuse. Protection often fails
because the representative work does not meet the elements under the
Copyright Act (originality, materiality, and identifiable authorship) that
would allow the community to own the copyright over the work.124
Works created on behalf of the community may fail to meet the
requirement that the work contain sufficiently distinct characteristics so as to
constitute an “original artistic work” within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.125 Section 32(1) of the Act provides that copyright exists “in an
original . . . artistic work.”126 The term “original” is not specifically defined
within the act. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines
“original” as “a model, pattern or archetype that is copied.”127 Originality, it
seems, is largely contingent on the existence of prior material: if a newer
work is premised on a prior model or pattern, only the prior model would
constitute the original. Thus, determination of whether a work of folklore is
122
Johanna Gibson, Justice of Precedent, Justness of Equity: Equitable Protection and Remedies for
Indigenous Intellectual Property, 6 AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS L. REP. 1, at 1 (2001) (Issue 4).
123
Cf. Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244 (Austl.) (holding that the only
recourse for the community is to bring a claim against the fiduciary as opposed to bringing a claim against
the party who actually misappropriated the communal artwork).
124
Rachael Grad, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: A Comparison of the United
States and Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 203, 227 (2003).
125
See generally Gibson, supra note 122.
126
Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth), § 32(1) (Austl.).
127
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1591 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., G & C
Merriam Co. 1967).
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original requires reference to prior works to determine if the creation in
question represents material already in the public domain, or if it is
sufficiently novel in and of itself to constitute an original.128 The High Court
of Australia129 (“High Court”) has adopted the view that courts must assess
the originality of a certain work by examining the substance of the work
compared to that of another.130 Even where a small portion of another work
is appropriated, if the portion taken constitutes a “material part” of the
greater work, then the greater work will not be deemed original under the
Act.131 For indigenous works in which the artist relies heavily on a preexisting traditional design as the material portion of the work, courts will be
reluctant to find sufficient originality within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.
Under the plain meaning of the term “original,” the artistic work in
question must not be a reproduction of another work. This restriction
presents a problem for works created on behalf of an Aboriginal community.
Artists are often given the task of creating artwork based on prior works or
based on existing folklore represented by Dreamings or other expressions of
culture.132 Aboriginal artists that are viewed as having the greatest skill are
those artists that can render established totemic designs with great “precision
and fidelity.”133 Each clan owns specific designs that are passed down
through generations, and select members are taught the sacred designs.134
Because of the repetitive nature of the designs, such works may not possess
the originality required under the Copyright Act. Although courts have
typically applied a low threshold for establishing originality, “some
observers caution that despite a lack of prior judicial comment on the matter,
it is a potentially substantial problem.”135
In addition to originality, the Copyright Act also requires that the work
be reduced to material form in order to initiate protection under the Act.136
128
See Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore, 9 WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG., Booklet 1.
129
The High Court of Australia, which consists of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, is the
country's supreme court and the final court of appeal for both the federal and state court systems. The High
Court of Australia—About the Court, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/justices_01.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2008) (listing the names of the Chief Justice and the six Associate Justices).
130
Data Access v. Powerflex Services (1999) 202 C.L.R. 1, 31-33 (Austl.) (citing Mason, C.J.
dissenting in Autodesk Inc. v. Dyason II 176 C.L.R. 300 (Austl.)).
131
See id.
132
See Githaiga, supra note 28, ¶¶ 4-21.
133
See LOUIS A. ALLEN, TIME BEFORE MORNING: ART AND MYTH OF THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES
33 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1975).
134
Id.
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See Githaiga, supra note 28, ¶ 20.
136
See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), § 22 (Austl.).
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The Act defines “material form” as “any form (whether visible or not) of
storage of the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the work or
adaptation, (whether or not the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of
the work or adaptation, can be reproduced).”137 The materiality requirement
poses a significant problem for various works of folklore. Indigenous
folklore includes oral stories and ritualistic songs and dance.138 For instance,
Dreaming stories represent a vital part of indigenous folklore, as these
stories often provide the subject matter for indigenous works of art.139 These
stories represent an oral tradition among individual clans, having been
handed down from one generation to another.140
Because these
representations of folklore are not expressed in material form, such works
are not protected.
Finally, various works of folklore within Aboriginal communities fail
to meet the third requirement under the Copyright Act that the work have an
identifiable author. Although the Copyright Act provides protection for joint
authorship of a work that is actually created by two or more authors, the Act
does not recognize alternative forms of collective ownership.141 For
instance, “membership of the author of a community whose customary laws
invest the community with ownership of any creation of its members is not
recognized.”142 Again, where the representations of Aboriginal folklore in
oral stories and dance rituals do not have a recognizable author, such works
fail to qualify for copyright protection.
B.

Even Where Communities Can Exercise a Copyright Interest Through
a Trust or Fiduciary Relationship, the Protection Still Falls Short

Australian courts, in cases such as Bulun Bulun, have found that under
some circumstances, indigenous communities can force an author to exercise
his copyright ownership to protect the work on behalf of the community.143
As a result, the community can force the author to exercise his or her right to
protect the work under the Copyright Act. However, the moral rights
provision under the Act grants the author the right to protect the work from
137

See id. § 10.
Australian
Government,
Australian
Indigenous
Cultural
Heritage,
http://www.cultureandrecreation.gov.au/articles/indigenous/ (last visited Jun. 27, 2009); Australian
Government, The Dreaming, http://www.cultureandrecreation.gov.au/articles/indigenous/dreamtime/ (last
visited Jun. 27, 2009).
139
Bobbie Leigh, Dreaming Stories, 27 ART & ANTIQUES 82, ¶¶ 9-11 (2004) (Issue 9), available at
http://www.annepetty.com/images/Dreaming_Stories.pdf.
140
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142
Id.
143
See id.
138

AUGUST 2009

AUSTRALIA’S HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT

565

derogatory use. These rights are inalienable and may only be exercised by
the author of the work.144 Logically then, once the author dies, so too does
the community’s ability to force the author to exercise the moral rights
connected to the work.
C.

Proposed Communal Moral Rights Legislation Will Not Sufficiently
Fill the Gaps in Protection of Communal Interests

Future legislation extending moral rights to communities will not
solve the Copyright Act’s inadequate protection of indigenous folklore.
Indigenous communal moral rights represent the most likely next step in the
Australian government’s attempt to protect communal works of indigenous
folklore. Members of Parliament seem to view indigenous communal moral
rights as a great step forward in the scheme of protecting indigenous creative
works.145 Such legislation, however, can just as easily be seen as merely a
step sideways with regards to protection under the current legal framework.
For instance, as evidenced by the court’s decision in Bulun Bulun,
indigenous communities already have the ability to compel an author to
enforce his or her rights, including moral rights, under the Copyright Act.
Thus, legislation adding communal moral rights simply codifies a form of
protection that courts have already recognized under the common law. Such
legislation would therefore provide no greater protection for most works
than can currently be achieved under current Australian law.146
One potential area of benefit could be an extended period of
protection for works of folklore. For instance, under the current Copyright
Act, moral rights only last for the term of the copyright itself,147 meaning the
life of the author plus 70 years.148 By allowing communities to exercise the
moral rights in perpetuity throughout their existence, such legislation may
actually provide at least some substantive benefit to communities. However,
without an actual bill to consider, it is mere speculation as to whether
Parliament would consider granting perpetual protections under the
Copyright Act when doing so would undermine one of the core theories of
copyright law: namely that authors will only be able to exercise their
144

Copyright Act § 195AN(3) (Austl.).
See RICHARD ALSTON, DARYL WILLIAMS, & PHILIP RUDDOCK, Joint Media Release (May 2003),
available at http://www.richardalston.dcita.gov.au/Article/0,,0_4-2_4008-4_114525,00.html.
146
See Ian McDonald, Australian Copyright Council staff attorney, Indigenous Communal Moral
Rights (July 16, 2003), www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A03n24.pdf (article to be published in
Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin).
147
Copyright Act, 1968, § 195AM(3) (Austl.).
148
Id. at § 33(2).
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copyright for a specifically designed period of time before the material
enters into the public domain to be used freely by everyone.
Furthermore, it is likely communities would only be able to exercise
their rights under very limited circumstances. For instance, the proposed
Draft Bill149 contained five conditions that would have to be met before a
community would qualify for moral rights: 1) there must be a work, 2) the
work must draw on the body of traditions or beliefs held in common by the
indigenous community, 3) there must be an agreement between the
community and the creator of the work, 4) there must be an
acknowledgement of the community’s association with the work, and 5)
interested parties in the work must consent to the initiation of the communal
moral rights.150 Additionally, each condition “must be met before the first
[commercial] dealing with the work, otherwise no rights arise.”151 Clearly,
the third and fifth requirements require mutual consent by both the
community and the author of the work prior to initiation of the moral rights.
Thus, because the third and fifth (and perhaps even the fourth) requirements
are conditional upon the creator’s own assent, it appears indigenous
communities would have no legal control without the blessing of the author.
It seems logical that if the author were willing to extend moral rights to
communities, that same author would be willing to exercise his or her moral
rights as a fiduciary of the community as in Bulun Bulun. Thus, under this
proposed regime, communal moral rights would not confer any additional
benefits upon a community that wishes to protect a certain work of folklore.
In fact, one author has suggested that, “[h]ypothetically speaking, under the
draft Bill [i]ndigenous communal moral rights would not have been
recognised in any of the copyright infringements that constitute Australian
jurisprudence in this area.”152 Thus, what is needed is a legal tool that
allows a community to protect its communal folklore when an author will
not or cannot exercise his moral rights, despite the community’s request.
Finally, these proposed communal moral rights, as with individual
moral rights, would only apply to works that qualify for protection under the
Copyright Act. Thus, the proposed legislation would fail to bridge the wide
gaps in the substance of copyright protection, such as for unfixed works,
works with no identifiable author, and works that fail to qualify as original.
Furthermore, when the copyright duration expires, anyone would have the
149
In 2003, an Indigenous Communal Moral Rights Draft Bill was circulated to a limited number of
parties. See supra Part II.A.
150
See Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 60, at 597-98.
151
Id.
152
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ability to copy the work, so long as the treatment was not derogatory. Moral
rights do not prevent the appropriation of a work once the copyright term
expires. Therefore, communal moral rights would be exercisable only where
the community feels an artistic work will be subject to derogatory treatment.
All other uses of the work will be sanctioned once the copyright term
expires. Thus, in order for communities to be able to assert an interest in
their cultural works of folklore, they need greater protection than can be
afforded by application of the Copyright Act alone.
V.

BY EXPANDING ITS PROTECTIVE SCOPE, THE HPA COULD PROVIDE THE
NECESSARY SECURITY FOR COMMUNAL WORKS OF FOLKLORE

The HPA was enacted in 1984 with the purpose of preserving and
protecting areas and objects in Australia “that are of particular significance
to Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.”153 The HPA enables
the Commonwealth to initiate protection over these areas and objects when
protection under the laws of the State or Territory falls short.154 Protections
can either be short-term or long-term, and are backed by criminal
sanctions.155 Although the HPA was introduced merely as a temporary
measure, the sunset clause was removed in 1986 when it appeared that future
land rights legislation would not be introduced.156
A.

The HPA Protects Aboriginal Areas and Objects of Particular
Significance

The scope of the HPA’s protections is somewhat narrow, limited to
those objects and areas of archeological or scientific value.157 Contemporary
works of folklore often do not qualify for protection.158 As such, the HPA
would need to undergo revisions before communities would be able to
effectively utilize the law to protect communal folklore. Interestingly, until
2006, the HPA did, in fact, afford some protection to contemporary works of
folklore, albeit only with respect to Aboriginal objects and areas located in
Victoria.159 In 1987, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage
153
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155
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expressions).
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Amendment Act (Amendment Act)160 added Part II.A to the HPA. Part II.A
applied only to Victoria,161 but expanded the definition of “Aboriginal
cultural property” to include not only “places” and “objects,” but also
“folklore.”162 Part II.A further defined “Aboriginal folklore” as “traditions
or oral histories that are or have been part of, or connected with, the cultural
life of Aboriginals (including songs, rituals, ceremonies, dances, art,
customs, and spiritual beliefs) and that are of particular significance to
Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.”163 The repeal of these
provisions in 2006 left the HPA as it stands today, limited to protecting only
significant Aboriginal objects and places from injury or desecration.164
The HPA does not grant indigenous communities a private right of
action to protect cultural property. Instead, the HPA places the power of
enforcement in the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.165 An Aboriginal
community that perceives a threat to a cultural object or place must file a
complaint with the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.166 The Minister has no
obligation to declare an object or place protected—this is true whether the
Minister receives a complaint or identifies a threat to cultural property in
some other way.167 Although the Minister must consider a report prepared
following an application by an Aboriginal community for the protection of a
“specified area”168 (the “Area Report Requirement”), no such requirement
exists for the protection of objects.169 With respect to applications for the
protection of cultural objects, the Minister must consult with the appropriate
Minister from the state or territory in which the problem arises in order to
determine whether the law of that state or territory provides sufficient
protection.170 The Honorable Elizabeth Evatt171 noted in her review of the
160
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HPA (“Evatt Review”)172 that “[t]here is no right to a declaration of
protection,” and the power to protect an area or site is entirely
discretionary.173 Thus, although the HPA provides a process for protecting
areas and objects of cultural importance, the enforcement mechanisms are
vested in regulators rather than communities, and would have to be revised
to provide substantive rights for Aboriginal communities.
B.

Compared to the Copyright Act, the HPA Provides a Superior
Platform for Protecting Communal Works of Folklore

When compared to the Copyright Act, the HPA has greater potential to
adequately protect communal interests in works of folklore. As discussed in
Part II of this comment, the Copyright Act applies only to identifiable
authors of a specific work.174 And, as noted in Part IV, even where a
community may benefit from protection under the Copyright Act, the Act
only affords protection for a limited period of time.175 Because Aboriginal
cultural property descends from generation to generation, protection limited
in duration does not adequately protect the communities’ interests. Thus, the
Copyright Act appears to be a poor platform for the exercise of communal
interests. The HPA, in contrast, could be a more appropriate vehicle for
communities to exercise interests in communal works of folklore.
Commentators have recognized the HPA’s potential as a means to
protect indigenous communities against misuse and misappropriation of
works of folklore176 and criticized the law for not establishing adequate
protection for such works.177 In its current form, the HPA does not allow
indigenous communities to protect works of folklore. For instance, the law
does not cover intangible aspects of culture such as oral histories and stories
or ceremonies involving song and dance.178 The Evatt Review notes that the
law does not cover all aspects of cultural heritage important to Aboriginal
people and highlights the fact that it “makes no provision concerning
intellectual property.”179 Indeed, “[m]ost applications under the Act have
other distinguished accomplishments.
International Commission of Jurists, Elizabeth Evatt,
http://www.icj.org/article.php3?id_article=2882&id_rubrique=13&lang=en (last visited May 1, 2009).
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related to areas and sites.”180 Even though it appears as though folklore in
the form of tangible artistic works such as paintings or sculptures could
qualify as “objects” under the HPA, this is not the case. Under Australian
cultural heritage laws, heritage is typically defined by its “scientific,
historical, or archaeological value,”181 and such legislation fails to
emphasize “living heritage,” and the cultural values of the community.182
Contemporary forms of indigenous art thus do not appear to qualify for
protection as “heritage” under Australia’s heritage laws. Finally, an order of
protection under the HPA is subject to the discretion of the Minister of
Aboriginal Affairs,183 leaving indigenous communities largely incapable of
exercising any affirmative or definitive power to protect their cultural works
under the HPA. As a result of these significant deficiencies within the law,
the HPA currently is not equipped to address communal concerns regarding
works of folklore.
Despite the HPA’s current shortcomings, its goals provide a strong
foundation for providing significant protection for indigenous folklore. As
stated in the Purposes of the Act, the HPA is intended to preserve and protect
from injury and desecration “areas and objects that are of particular
significance to Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal tradition.”184
Additionally, the Evatt Review notes that the HPA “is a law for the benefit of
Aboriginal people.”185 Communal works of folklore could fall squarely
under the purposes of the HPA. Indigenous communities do not wish to
protect such works based on the works’ individual economic or societal
value as would be the purpose under the Copyright Act, but rather to protect
these works based on cultural value to the community.
Because
communities view these communal works as sacred due to their traditional
aspects and because these traditional aspects are at the very core of what
indigenous communities desire to protect,186 the HPA is an ideal tool to
safeguard these works of folklore. By placing protection of such works
under the umbrella of a law that more closely coincides with indigenous
concerns and purpose, courts may find it much easier to enforce those
protections.
By extending protection to communal works of folklore, the HPA
could effectively complement the Copyright Act’s individual protections
180
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183
184
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with communal protection over works of folklore in specific circumstances
where individual protections would not suffice. Such protections may
appear to encroach upon the province of the Copyright Act. Section 8 of the
Act provides that “copyright does not subsist otherwise than by virtue of this
Act.”187 Further protections provided under the HPA for copyrightable
works (artistic works, performances, etc.) may be seen as a de facto
copyright protection that should be barred under the Copyright Act.
However, by placing the emphasis on protection of the underlying tradition
and culture that folklore represents, the HPA may be viewed not as
legislation tangentially extending copyright, but rather as existing legislation
being expanded to include additional cultural works. Also, under the HPA,
protections are extended only as a “last resort.”188 This emphasis could
remain an underlying goal of a revised HPA. Thus, the Copyright Act’s
protections could still remain valid and controlling except where such
protections fall short. Under circumstances where the protection falls
outside of the copyright realm, HPA provisions protecting communal works
would be triggered, thereby providing communities with an avenue of relief
that is otherwise unavailable under the Copyright Act.
By widening the scope of the HPA’s focus to include a broader
definition of cultural objects that encompasses works of folklore similar to
that of Part II.A, the HPA could be used to effectively protect indigenous
works of folklore throughout the country. A revised HPA could place the
power of protection with the courts as opposed to the Minister of Aboriginal
Affairs. Instead of granting indigenous communities a passive right to bring
their concerns to an official who is under no obligation to extend adequate
protections, the HPA could grant certain rights on behalf of the community
to protect their property in a similar fashion to the protection afforded to
artists under the Copyright Act and provide a judicial review mechanism for
administering such rights. In determining whether a certain work of folklore
requires protection under a revised HPA, the courts could use an objective
test measured by indigenous customary law. Prior cases indicate that courts
are relatively comfortable using indigenous customary law to determine
whether indigenous interests merit legal protection. For instance, in Bulun
187
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Bulun, the Federal Court was willing to recognize a fiduciary relationship
between the Galanbingu community and an individual artist once the Court
determined that under customary law and tradition the relationship between
artist and community was one of trust.189 In a similar vein, where a
community has expressed concern regarding a work of folklore, courts could
determine whether, under the customary law and tradition, the community
has an interest in the work and whether the interest warrants protection by
the HPA.
The courts have provided similar tests in determining whether to
recognize Aboriginal communal rights in property. In Mabo v. The State of
Queensland [No. 2],190 the High Court found that the common law of
Australia recognized a form of native title where the right to such title is
grounded in the customs or laws of the people.191 The High Court
emphasized the importance of looking to evidence of traditional laws and
customs of the community that give rise to an interest in the land.192 This
analysis by the court could be transplanted into the context of protection of
folklore: where the community is able to provide evidence that their
“traditional laws and customs” give rise to an interest in the work, the
community could maintain a claim for the protection of such works under
the HPA.
By granting similar rights to an individual author under the Copyright
Act and to a community under the HPA, there may initially appear to be a
conflict between the two laws. Where a community has an interest in
opposition to those interests of the individual creator, should the individual’s
interests win out under Copyright law, or should the communal interests take
precedence under the HPA? Although it may seem that a conflict of interests
could present a serious problem, the courts have already defined a solution.
In Bulun Bulun, where both the individual author and the community
expressed different claims in a single work, the Federal Court was able to
address both concerns by applying the communities’ customary laws.
Communities will only have a valid claim where the creator of the work of
folklore has in some way been given permission by the community to create
a work, or has otherwise appropriated some cultural aspect that the clan
perceives as being owned by the community. Thus, customary law would
draw the boundary lines with regard to whether the law governing the

189
190
191
192

See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 86 F.C.R. 244, 259.
Mabo and Other Plaintiffs v. the State of Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 58-62.

AUGUST 2009

AUSTRALIA’S HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT

573

individual (copyright) or the law governing the community (HPA) should
apply.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has argued that the Australian Copyright Act does not
adequately protect Aboriginal folklore. The Copyright Act protects only
original works with identifiable authors that are reduced to a material form.
These requirements are problematic in the context of indigenous folklore.
Indigenous artwork and other cultural works draw on traditional designs and
culture that have evolved over many generations, and, as such are not
original and do not have readily identifiable creators in the classic sense.
Furthermore, indigenous folklore includes oral stories and dance ceremonies
that do not fall under the formal materiality requirement articulated in the
Copyright Act. Though amendment of the Copyright Act could address
these issues to a limited extent, more adequate protection would be better
achieved by amending the HPA.
As the U.N. Declaration discussed above illustrates, there is an
international consensus that indigenous people have a right to have their
heritage and folklore protected. If Australia hopes to keep pace with human
rights standards, it should consider placing protections outside the realm of
copyright law. The HPA’s goals parallel indigenous concerns regarding their
folklore. By amending the HPA to include certain enforcement mechanisms
and to extend its protective scope, the law could prove an effective new tool
for Australia’s indigenous communities to protect their folklore and their
heritage.

